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Abstract
This paper examines the choice of tools for managing a ﬁrm’s operational
risks: cash reserves, insurance contracts, and ﬁnancial assets under an opti-
mal ﬁnancing contract that solves moral hazard between insiders and outside
investors. Risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of raising
external ﬁnancing, increases debt capacity, lessens underinvestment, and im-
proves welfare. I show that insurance is superior as it facilitates the outside
ﬁnancing relationship but leads to ineﬃcient excessive continuation if used
without coverage limits. When insurance against an operational risk is not
available, the ﬁrm uses ﬁnancial assets instead or resorts to holding cash
reserves.
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1 Introduction
Risk management is a very important area of corporate decision making as it en-
tails assessing and adjusting corporations’ exposure to various sources of risk by
the use of ﬁnancial derivatives, insurance contracts, and other activities. Financial
executives and CEOs report risk management as one of their most important con-
cerns.1 The literature on risk management generally assumes that managers act
in the best interests of ﬁrms’ shareholders and describes the optimal risk shifting
between agents. In contrast, this paper investigates the role risk management plays
in the relationship between corporate insiders and outside investors with conﬂicting
interests under moral hazard in a world of universal risk neutrality. In other words,
I derive the reason why corporate risk management is pursued from agency-based
considerations. In my setup, risk management is valuable as it reduces the costs of
raising external ﬁnancing, increases a ﬁrm’s debt capacity, lessens underinvestment,
and improves welfare.
I analyze how insurance contracts are employed to manage a ﬁrm’s operational
risk, and I compare situations when insurance is available and when it is not in
an optimal contracting framework.2 In my setting, the insurance contract elimi-
nates information asymmetry between a corporate insider and an outside investor
and hence allows for better contracting. A better contracting environment leads
to lower costs of raising funds and the insurance contract facilitates the outside
ﬁnancing relationship. I also show that insurance contracts are not uniformly ben-
eﬁcial. Besides an eﬃciency increase due to increased debt capacity, insurance has
a negative eﬀect as well; it ex post induces the excessive continuation of the ﬁrm,
which is ex ante ineﬃcient. I investigate in detail costs and beneﬁts from using
insurance on a ﬁrm’s debt capacity, the optimality of the investment decision, and
1See, for example, Bodnar et al. (1998) or Rawls and Smithson (1990).
2See von Thadden (1995) for a similar optimal contracting framework.
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insiders’ payoﬀ to provide conditions under which insurance is beneﬁcial. To avoid
ineﬃcient excessive continuation, the insider seeks insurance contracts with upper
limits on the extent of insurance coverage. If setting such limits is impossible or
if no insurance contract for a particular operational risk is available—when it is
diﬃcult to write formal insurance contracts because the underlying shock cannot
be well-described ex ante or objectively measured ex post—the insider substitutes
insurance by investing in ﬁnancial assets or resorts to holding cash. Finally, I inves-
tigate costs and beneﬁts from using ﬁnancial assets and compare these with costs
and beneﬁts from using insurance contracts and holding cash reserves.
This paper is related to the literature on the determinants of hedging and the lit-
erature on corporate demand for liquidity. The hedging literature investigates how
violating the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) makes risk management
activities beneﬁcial. Stulz (1984) argues that ﬁrms do hedge because managers who
are in charge of corporate decision making are risk averse. Smith and Stulz (1985)
show that ﬁrms should manage risks if they face a convex corporate tax schedule or
deadweight costs of ﬁnancial distress. DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1995) add that hedging
is used because it improves the informativeness of corporate earnings as a signal of
management ability. Finally, Brown and Toft (2002) analyze whether a ﬁrm fac-
ing both hedgeable and unhedgeable risk should use standard forward and options
contracts or more exotic derivative structures. From this literature, my model is
close to that used by Froot et al. (1993). According to their model, ﬁrms who
face convex costs of external ﬁnancing do perform risk management operations if
their investment decisions depend on the amount of internal resources available.3
In this case, the optimal risk management policy equalizes the marginal payoﬀ from
3Rochet and Villeneuve (2004) have provided theoretical treatments of precautionary corporate
liquidity holdings. Anderson and Carverhill (2005), and Mello and Parsons (2000) study a demand
for liquidity and hedging decision of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm in a dynamic setting. A similar
framework is used by Boyle and Guthrie (2003), who concentrate on how liquidity of a ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm aﬀects the timing of corporate investment decisions.
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total resources available for investing across all states of the world. Similarly to
Froot et al., insurance is useful in my model because it reduces the costs of external
ﬁnancing. In contrast to their paper, I endogenize the costs of external ﬁnancing
by introducing moral hazard into the borrowing/lending relationship. The moral
hazard is solved and the borrowing/lending decision (and hence the investment
decision) is determined by the optimal ﬁnancing contract between the insider and
the outside investor.
My model builds upon the analysis by Holmström and Tirole (1998), which
establishes a link between the literature on corporate demand for liquidity and
corporate risk management. Holmström and Tirole show that ﬁrms do hold cash
as a buﬀer to cover stochastic liquidity shocks to their cash ﬂows; in other words,
cash reserves are used as a rough risk management tool. I take the extended version
of their risk-management-by-holding-cash result as a benchmark and further enrich
the analysis by introducing insurance contracts and ﬁnancial assets as on-hand tools
available for changing the risk exposure of a ﬁrm.
I characterize basic elements of the model in the next section. In section 3, I
solve the optimal contracting problem between the insider and the outside investor
when to hold cash reserves is the only risk management option. Section 4 deﬁnes
insurance and solves for an optimal contract with insurance. I discuss costs and
beneﬁts from using insurance contracts in section 5, discuss ﬁnancial assets in
section 6, and conclude in section 7.
2 Model
There are three dates t = 0, 1
2
, 1; two periods (the ﬁrst between dates 0 and 1
2
and the second between dates 1
2
and 1); and two agents. Both agents are risk-
neutral with an additively separable utility function over undiscounted consumption
streams: u(c0, c 1
2
, c1) = c0 + c 1
2
+ c1. There is one universal good (called "cash")
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used for consumption and investment, which is storable at a zero interest rate.
One agent (manager, insider, or she) has access to a stochastic constant-returns-
to-scale production technology, which I call from now on a "project." The manager
has endowment of cash A > 0 at date 0, and no endowments at dates 1
2
and 1. The
manager raises additional cash from the other agent (investor, outsider, or he) who
is assumed to have enough cash at all dates. The parties sign an optimal ﬁnancial
contract that allows the manager to raise additional funding to invest in the project
at date 0.
The project bears an operational risk at date 1
2
and a fundamental risk at date 1.
Due to the fundamental risk at date 1, the project does not always deliver a positive
payoﬀ: if investment of size I > 0 is made at date 0 and the project succeeds, the
payoﬀ at date 1 is RI > 0; whereas, if the project fails, the payoﬀ at date 1 is 0.4
Date 1 project’s payoﬀs are veriﬁable. The fundamental risk is subject to eﬀort
moral hazard. In the second period, the manager privately chooses probability p of
project’s success (of payoﬀ RI). She can exert either high or low eﬀort. If she exerts
high eﬀort, the probability of success is pH ; if she exerts low eﬀort, the probability
of success is pL, where 0 < pL < pH < 1. If the manager shirks, she enjoys private
beneﬁts BI > 0. The amount of cash invested I is a continuous variable and is
subject only to ﬁnancing constraints.
The operational risk captures the idea that the manager might need more cash
before the project is completed than was planned initially at date 0. At intermediate
date 1
2
, an additional uncertain amount of cash has to be spent to cover such
unexpected cash need (a liquidity shock). If required additional cash is paid, the
project continues and the ﬁnal payoﬀ is realized at date 1 as described above.5
If additional cash is not paid the project terminates at date 1
2
yielding nothing
4For simplicity I consistently deﬁne all "cash" variables on a per-unit-of-investment basis;
therefore, cash payoﬀ at date 1, RI, is R · I where R > 0 can be understood as the gross return
per unit of investment.
5By covering the liquidity shock, the initial size of the project I remains unchanged.
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and investment I is lost. The liquidity shock attains two values ρ˜I = {ρI, ρI}
(referred to as the low shock and the high shock), where 0 < ρ < ρ. The project
is hit by low liquidity shock ρI with probability α and by high liquidity shock ρI
with probability 1 − α. Liquidity shock can be interpreted as a shock to a ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂows. The high shock is more harmful as it makes the ﬁrm more diﬃcult to
sustain. The structure of the project and risks involved are common knowledge,
but once realized the size of the liquidity shock is revealed only to the manager and
is unobservable for the investor. The manager can unilaterally quit the contract
with the investor and consume all cash left in the project (if any) at date 1
2
, which
creates the second source of moral hazard.
Finally, I assume that the project cannot be liquidated partially at date 1
2
(nondivisibility) and the manager cannot pay out more cash than she has at any
given date (limited liability). The timeline of the project is depicted in the ﬁgure
below.
Figure 1: Project’s timeline
The following assumptions apply:
A1 Given the realization of high liquidity shock ρI, the project has a negative
continuation value at date 1
2
even if high eﬀort is exerted, pHR− ρ < 0.6
A2 Given the realization of low liquidity shock ρI, the project has a positive
6Since pH > pL, if low eﬀort is exerted pLR− ρ < 0 as well.
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continuation value at date 1
2
if high eﬀort is exerted, pHR − ρ > 0, but a
negative continuation value if low eﬀort is exerted, pLR− ρ < 0.
3 Contracting without Insurance
3.1 First-best
Assumption A1 implies that if the project is hit by the high liquidity shock it
should be abandoned at date 1
2
, and assumption A2 implies that high eﬀort should
be exerted if the low shock is realized. With these optimal rules, the expected
ﬁrst-best value of the project is VFB = A +
[
α(pHR − ρ)− 1
]
IFB.
Lemma 1. Optimal ﬁrst-best investment is inﬁnite, I∗FB −→ ∞, if α(pHR−ρ) > 1;
zero, I∗FB = 0, if α(pHR − ρ) < 1; and any positive real number, I∗FB ∈ [0,∞), if
α(pHR− ρ) = 1.
A3 For the remainder of the paper I assume that the expected ﬁrst-best return
per unit of investment is positive, α(pHR−ρ) > 1, and the project should be
undertaken with inﬁnite investment in the ﬁrst-best world.
3.2 Optimal Financing Contract under Moral Hazard
This section establishes the benchmark for the analysis. Similarly to Holmström
and Tirole (1998), I show that a pile of cash held from date 0 to date 1
2
allows the
manager to sustain the liquidity shock and hence serves as a risk management tool.
To raise ﬁnancing the manager oﬀers a contract to the investor at date 0. The
market for external ﬁnancing is competitive and the investor accepts the contract
if he breaks even. The manager and the investor cannot commit to a two-period
contract and the parties will renegotiate the initial contract if it is beneﬁcial for
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them to do so at date 1
2
. The optimal ﬁnancing contract is characterized in the
following proposition:7
Proposition 1. The optimal contract C∗ = {T ∗R, T ∗0 , I∗, L∗} has the following prop-
erties:
a) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s failure
is T ∗0 = 0;
b) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s success
is T ∗R = min{T
1
2
R , T
1
R}, where
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T
1
2
R ≡ R− ρpH < R and
T 1R ≡ R− BpH−pL < R;
c) total loan provided by the investor satisﬁes L∗ = I∗ − A + ρI∗ = αpHT ∗RI∗ > 0;
d) investment is I∗ = A 1
1+ρ−αpHT ∗R > 0;
e) manager’s expected payoﬀ is P ∗ = A
(
1 +
α(pHR−ρ)−1
1+ρ−αpHT ∗R
)
> A;
f) investor’s expected proﬁt is Π∗ = 0;
For the contract to exist, the following conditions on ρ have to be satisﬁed: if
T ∗R = T
1
2
R , the existence condition is 0 < ρ
1
2
min < ρ < ρmax; and if T
∗
R = T
1
R, the ex-
istence condition is 0 < ρ1
min
< ρ < ρ
max
; where ρ
1
2
min ≡ αpHR−11+α , ρ1min ≡ αpHT 1R − 1,
and ρ
max
≡ αpHR−1
α
.
There are two moral hazards the optimal contract has to solve. First, the
manager can shirk in the second period, which limits transfer T 1R the investor can
receive at date 1 by the amount needed to induce the manager to exert high eﬀort,
B
pH−pL . Second, the manager can consume cash at date
1
2
, which limits transfer T
1
2
R
the investor can receive by the amount needed to induce the manager not to do it
when the low shock arrives and to continue the project, ρ
pH
. Since both incentive
constraints have to be satisﬁed at the same time, transfer T ∗R is determined by the
incentive compatible condition that is binding ﬁrst. The focus of this paper is on the
case not analyzed by Holmström and Tirole (1998), when the cash stealing moral
7Proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix.
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hazard is more severe than the eﬀort moral hazard, T
1
2
R < T
1
R ⇐⇒ B < pH−pLpH ρ.
As the size of the liquidity shock is unobservable for the investor and he is unable
to elicit truth-telling, he does not provide any additional contingent ﬁnancing at
date 1
2
. Intuitively, if the manager sends a message that the liquidity shock is high,
it is optimal to shut the project down and not to provide any additional cash. If
the investor is ready to provide additional ﬁnancing at date 1
2
following a low shock
message, the manager will always report the shock to be low. If the true liquidity
shock is low, the project is eﬃciently continued, but if the true shock is high,
the managers consumes all additional cash provided and the project is abandoned.
Also, to induce the manager to tell the truth by adjusting her date 1 payoﬀ is not
feasible as well. This is because the date 1
2
cash stealing moral hazard is followed by
the eﬀort moral hazard in the second period. The incentive constraint that elicits
high eﬀort in the second period is binding and ﬁxes the payoﬀs for the investor and
the manager at date 1. Hence, the manager’s date 1 payoﬀ cannot be altered to
elicit the truth about the size of the liquidity shock at date 1
2
as it would conﬂict
with the high eﬀort choice.
The cash stealing moral hazard is solved by the optimal contract as follows:
at date 0, when the contract is signed, part of total loan L∗ is invested into the
project, I∗−A, and the rest is held as cash reserves from date 0 to date 1
2
to cover
the coming liquidity shock. The size of the cash holding is equal to the amount
needed to cover low liquidity shock ρI∗. For this implementation to work, one
has to assume either that investment I∗ is veriﬁable or that the investor is able
to commit to not providing any additional cash at date 1
2
. These assumptions are
necessary to incentivize the manager not to invest the whole loan at date 0 (her
payoﬀ is increasing in investment) and put aside cash to cover the low liquidity
shock. The second possible implementation is as follows: the investor provides his
loan in two noncontingent instalments L∗ = L∗0+L∗1
2
, where L∗0 = I∗−A is the loan
9
at date 0 and L∗1
2
= ρI∗ is the loan at date 1
2
. The manager uses L∗0 for investment
and L∗1
2
is used to cover the low liquidity shock. In both cases the investor pays
amount ρI∗ no matter what liquidity shock arrives, and this translates into the
costs of external ﬁnancing as cash is ineﬃciently consumed by the manager when
the high shock is realized and the project is terminated.
When the project is hit by the high liquidity shock (probability 1−α) or when
the project ends up with failure (probability 1 − pH), the payoﬀ to the investor
is zero. When the project is hit by the low liquidity shock and results in success
(probability αpH) the investor receives per-unit-of-investment transfer T ∗R. As a re-
sult, the investor is willing to provide loan L∗ equal only to the expected pledgeable
income, αpHT ∗RI∗.
The level of investment I∗ is ﬁnite and therefore lower than in the ﬁrst-best
case. Investment is increasing in the manager’s initial cash endowment A, with
probability that the low liquidity shock appears α, with probability that the project
succeeds (given high eﬀort) pH , and with project’s payoﬀ following success R. On
the other hand, an increase in low liquidity shock ρ or an increase in private beneﬁts
B increases the cost of external ﬁnancing and optimal investment I∗ decreases.
4 Contracting with Insurance
4.1 Insurance
I introduce operational risk insurance by enabling the manager to invest cash into an
insurance contract whose payoﬀ is perfectly negatively correlated with the project’s
liquidity shock ρ˜. If the manager pays λH in insurance premium at date 0, the
insurance coverage at date 1
2
is ρH if the low liquidity shock is realized and ρH
if the high liquidity shock is realized (H is the number of cash units of insurance
purchased and λ stands for the unit price of insurance). To be consistent with the
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perfect competitiveness in the market for outside ﬁnancing, I assume that insurance
is available at a fair price: λH ≡ αρH + (1− α)ρH . Insurance is a very powerful
instrument in contracting between the manager and the investor as it allows them
to overcome the problem of the unobservable liquidity shock at date 1
2
.
Real world insurance contracts that coincide with this model are, for exam-
ple, corporate property and casualty insurance or business interruption insurance.
Chesler and Anglim (2001; 1) describe the business interruption insurance as fol-
lows: “The purpose of business interruption coverage is to protect the insured
against a loss of income if it suﬀers a loss that causes it to suspend operations.
...[B]usiness interruption coverage can put the insured in the position it would be
in if no loss had occurred.”
In this model, the investor is by assumption separated from the insurer; in other
words, the investor does not write insurance contracts and the insurance company
is not a lender. This is because the main interest of this paper is to investigate how
the plain use of the insurance contract with standard properties that mimic real
world aﬀects the contracting of a loan between the manager and the investor. I do
not aim at designing the optimal insurance coverage agreed among the manager,
the investor, and an insurance company. At the same time, the assumption that
the investor is separated from the insurer is supported by extensive anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that mergers of banks and insurance companies and the, so-called,
"bancassurance" model is a failure.8 Most probably this is because insurance and
lending involve diﬀerent monitoring technologies which result in necessary special-
ization and separation. The investor specializes in assessing a project’s fundamental
value and provides a loan based on the expected repayment, whereas the insurer
specializes in assessing the size of damages to the business’ operations triggered
8See for example the article in McKinsey Quarterly 2003 No. 2 by Lars et al. stating: “And
though many large bancassurance deals took place in the period, they receive the thumbs-down:
market weren’t convinced that uniting two activities as diﬀerent as insurance and banking creates
value.”(p. 2)
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by random events and adjusts the payoﬀ accordingly. In order to write insurance
contracts, the insurer has to be able to ex ante deﬁne and well describe risks cov-
ered by the contract and to objectively measure the impact of events on the ﬁrm’s
operations ex post. This is complex as many operational risks are business speciﬁc
and require special expertise.9 In other words, not only are the investor and the
insurer specialized in observing distinct features of the project, the timing is also
diﬀerent; the investor does the monitoring ex ante, before the investment is made,
whereas the insurer monitors ex post, after the shock hits the ﬁrm. Consistently,
I assume that it is prohibitively costly for the investor to observe date 1
2
liquidity
shock and for the insurer to observe terminal date 1 project’s payoﬀs.10 Finally,
I assume that the payoﬀ from the insurance contract directly oﬀsets the liquidity
shock and hence the manager cannot consume the payoﬀ from insurance before it
is used to cover the liquidity shock. This is a standard provision of property and
casualty or business interruption insurance contracts.
4.2 First-best with Insurance
Within the ﬁrst-best framework with the possibility of insurance, I ﬁrst discuss the
case when the liquidity shock is fully insured and hence eliminated.
Lemma 2. In the case of full insurance, H = IFB,i,11 the expected ﬁrst-best value
of the project is VFB,i = A+(pHR−1−λ)IFB,i and the expected ﬁrst-best per-unit-
of-investment return is lower relative to the ﬁrst-best case with cash reserves.
9See for example the article in McKinsey Quarterly December 2005 by Markus et al. argu-
ing: “Knowledge and talent management are critical to [Property and casualty insurer’s] success,
particularly because risk data for niche products are limited. This deﬁciency makes statisti-
cal analysis diﬃcult and means that companies must base their underwriting more on informed
judgement.”(p. 4)
10The alternative explanation of separation of raising external ﬁnancing and providing insurance
is as follows: Insurance serves as a monitoring device for dispersed investors who due to a free-
riding problem have no incentive to monitor risks involved in the business. In this case, the insider
pays the insurance premium to the insurer to do the monitoring for the investors.
11Subscript i indicates the case with full insurance.
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Proof. The expected ﬁrst-best value of the project under full insurance, H = IFB,i,
is VFB,i = A−IFB,i−λH+α
[
pHRIFB,i − ρ(IFB,i −H)
]
+(1−α) [pHR− ρ(IFB,i −H)],
which simpliﬁes to VFB,i = A + (pHR − 1 − λ)IFB,i. Full insurance gives higher
expected per-unit-of-investment returns relative to the ﬁrst-best no-insurance case
iﬀ pHR−1−λ ≥ α(pHR−ρ)−1, which is, under fair price of insurance, equivalent
to ρ ≤ pHR. The last inequality violates A1.
Similarly, it is easy to show that in the ﬁrst-best world partial insurance, H <
IFB,i, is worse than no-insurance as well.
Lemma 3. In the case of partial insurance, H < IFB,i, the expected ﬁrst-best per-
unit-of-investment return is lower relative to the ﬁrst-best case with cash reserves.12
The results of Lemmas 2 and 3 are driven by the fact that in the ﬁrst-best world
without moral hazard, the risk neutrality of agents precludes any positive eﬀect in-
surance might have. At the same time, full insurance leads to the elimination of the
high liquidity shock, the project is not terminated when the high shock is realized,
and full insurance hence induces the excessive continuation of the project relative
to the no insurance case. The eﬃciency from not covering the high liquidity shock
and stopping the project when it arrives is lost. In the case of partial insurance,
eﬃciency decreases as well since the part of insurance premium paid to cover the
high liquidity shock is a waste.
4.3 Optimal Financing Contract with Full Insurance under
Moral Hazard
This section shows that in contrast to the ﬁrst-best world full insurance has a
positive eﬀect when the manager is separated from the investor and the project
12Proof of Lemma 3 is provided in the Appendix.
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is subject to moral hazard. The following assumption ensures that full insurance
could be beneﬁcial:
A4 In expectation formed at date 0, the project has a positive value if high eﬀort
is exerted and the expected value of the liquidity shock is paid: α(pHR− 1−
ρ) + (1− α)(pHR− 1− ρ) > 0.13
If A4 is satisﬁed, the expected ﬁrst-best value of the project under full insur-
ance VFB,i is positive and increasing in investment. Similarly to the case without
insurance, the manager oﬀers the contract to the investor at date 0, the market for
external ﬁnancing is competitive, and the investor accepts the contract if he breaks
even. The optimal ﬁnancing contract is characterized in Proposition 2.14
Proposition 2. The optimal contract C∗i = {T ∗R,i, T ∗0,i, I∗i , L∗i } has the following
properties:
a) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s failure
is T ∗0,i = 0;
b) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s success
is T ∗R,i ≡ R− BpH−pL < R;
c) total loan provided by the investor satisﬁes L∗i = (1 + λ)I∗i − A = pHT ∗R,iI∗i > 0;
d) investment is I∗i = A
1
1+λ−pHT ∗R,i
> 0;
e) manager’s expected payoﬀ is P ∗i = A
(
1 + pHR−(1+λ)
1+λ−pHT ∗R,i
)
> A;
f) investor’s expected proﬁt is Π∗i = 0;
For the contract to exist, the following conditions on λ have to be satisﬁed: 0 <
λmin < λ < λmax, where λmin ≡ pHT ∗R,i − 1 and λmax ≡ pHR− 1.15
13Note that A1 implies that pHR − 1 − ρ < 0, and therefore one needs pHR − 1 − ρ > 0 in
order for A4 to be satisﬁed. A1 and A2 also imply that in expectation formed at date 0, the
project has a negative value if low eﬀort is exerted: α(pLR− 1− ρ) + (1− α)(pLR− 1− ρ) < 0.
14Proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Appendix.
15The equilibrium exists for reasonable parameter values since 0 < λmin ⇔ pHR−1pH > BpH−pL ,
which is consistent with the no-insurance case, and λmin < λmax for any B > 0. See the proof of
this Proposition for more details.
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At date 0, when the contract is signed, part of total loan L∗i is invested into the
project, I∗i −A, and the rest is used to purchase insurance coverage for the coming
liquidity shock, λI∗i . Since the liquidity shock is fully eliminated by insurance,
there is no need for the investor to provide cash to the manager at date 1
2
and
for the manager to hold cash from date 0 to 1
2
. The ineﬃciency caused by the
unobservability of the liquidity shock and the possibility of the manager to consume
cash reserves when the high liquidity shock arrives is eliminated by insurance.
This reduces the cost of raising cash from the outside investor, increases the debt
capacity of the project, L∗i , and hence increases investment I∗i . On the other hand,
the project is not abandoned if the high liquidity shock arrives which causes a new
ineﬃciency—the project is continued excessively (relative to the no insurance case)
with an adverse eﬀect on its debt capacity and investment.
As in the case with cash reserves the manager can shirk in the second period,
which limits transfer T ∗R,i the investor can receive by the amount needed to induce
the manager to exert high eﬀort, B
pH−pL . The cash-stealing incentive constraint is
eliminated by insurance. The investor is willing to provide loan L∗i equal to the
expected pledgeable income, pHT ∗R,iI∗i . The level of investment I∗i is ﬁnite (lower
than I∗FB,i), increasing in the manager’s initial cash endowment, A, increasing in
the probability that the project succeeds (given high eﬀort), pH , and increasing in
project’s payoﬀ following success, R. On the other hand, an increase in cost of
insurance λ or an increase in private beneﬁts B decreases investment.
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5 Costs and Benefits of Insurance
5.1 Eﬀect of Full Insurance on Investment, Debt Capacity,
and Insider’s Payoﬀ
This section shows under what conditions the full insurance contract increases
investment, the debt capacity of the project, and the manager’s payoﬀ. The eﬀect
of full insurance is not obvious as the eﬃciency increase from the elimination of
the liquidity shock trades oﬀ against the ineﬃcient excessive project’s continuation
relative to the no insurance case.
Consider the case without insurance when the date 1 incentive constraint on
managerial eﬀort is binding, T ∗R = T 1R = T ∗R,i. Investment under full insurance is
higher than investment in the no-insurance case iﬀ
I∗i > I
∗ ⇔ (1− α)(ρ− ρ) < (1− α)pHT ∗R,i ⇔ ρ− ρ < pH
(
R− B
pH − pL
)
. (1)
The left-hand-side of (1) stands for the expected cost of excessive continuation
associated with full insurance (the additional cash spent on the insurance premium
to ineﬃciently cover the high liquidity shock) whereas the right-hand-side stands for
the expected additional pledgeable income the investor receives when the project
is fully insured. If the value of the option to close the project following the high
liquidity shock is high (ρ−ρ is high) and/or if the eﬀort moral hazard is large ( B
pH−pL
is large), condition (1) is not satisﬁed and the total investment in the project is
higher under no insurance.
The debt capacity of the project under full insurance is higher than the debt
capacity in the no-insurance case iﬀ
L∗i > L
∗ ⇔ pHT
∗
R,i
1 + λ
>
αpHT
1
R
1 + ρ
⇔ ρ− ρ < 1 + ρ
α
. (2)
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The debt capacity of the project under full insurance is higher if the expected return
to the investor per unit of total investment under insurance
pHT
∗
R,i
1+λ
is higher than
the expected return per unit of total investment under no insurance αpHT
∗
R
1+ρ
. If the
low liquidity shock is high and/or the cost of insurance is low, the debt capacity is
higher under insurance.
Finally, the manager’s payoﬀ under full insurance is higher than the manager’s
payoﬀ in the no-insurance case iﬀ
P ∗i > P
∗ ⇔ pH
(
R− T ∗R,i
)
1 + λ
> α
pH(R− T 1R)
1 + ρ
+
1− α
1 + ρ
(
ρ− pHT
∗
R,i
1 + λ
)
. (3)
The left-hand-side of inequality (3) stands for the expected manager’s payoﬀ per
unit of total investment when the project is fully insured. The ﬁrst term on the
right-hand-side of (3) is the expected manager’s payoﬀ per unit of total investment
when the project is not insured and the low shock arrives. The second term stands
for the diﬀerence in the expected manager’s payoﬀ per unit of total investment
between the no-insurance and the full insurance case. When the high liquidity
shock arrives and the project is not insured, the manager consumes cash ρ she
brings to date 1
2
, whereas she consumes the equivalent of this cash given by fraction
pHT
∗
R,i
1+λ
when the project is insured.
The situation when the date 1
2
non-stealing incentive constraint is binding in
the case without insurance, T ∗R = T
1
2
R < T
∗
R,i, gives similar results. The investment
under full insurance is higher than the investment in the no-insurance case iﬀ
I∗i > I
∗ ⇔ αpHT
1
2
R < pHT
∗
R,i − (1− α)(ρ− ρ). (4)
The left-hand-side of (4) stands for the investor’s total expected payoﬀ if the project
is not insured. The right-hand-side is the investor’s total expected payoﬀ if the
project is fully insured decreased by the cost of excessive continuation associated
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with this insurance (insurance premium paid ineﬃciently). The debt capacity of
the project under full insurance is higher than the debt capacity in the no-insurance
case iﬀ
L∗i > L
∗ ⇔ pHT
∗
R,i
1 + λ
>
αpHT
1
2
R
1 + ρ
. (5)
The debt capacity of the project under full insurance is higher if the expected
return to the investor per unit of total investment under full insurance
pHT
∗
R,i
1+λ
is
higher than the expected return per unit of investment under no insurance αpHT
1
2
R
1+ρ
.
Finally, the manager’s payoﬀ under full insurance is higher than the manager’s
payoﬀ in the no-insurance case iﬀ
P ∗i > P
∗ ⇔ pHR− (1 + λ)
1 + λ− pHT ∗R,i
>
α(pHR− ρ)− 1
1 + ρ− αpHT
1
2
R
. (6)
Overall, full insurance tends to dominate holding cash reserves in managing opera-
tional risk as the low shock increases (the ineﬃciency caused by the consumption of
the cash reserves by the manager when the high shock arrives in the no-insurance
case increases) or as the high shock decreases (the ineﬃciency caused by the ex-
cessive project’s continuation when the high shock arrives under the insurance
decreases).
Also, the manager never prefers to combine holding a partial cash reserve (hold-
ing cash from date 0 to 1
2
in an amount lower than the size of the low liquidity
shock) with covering the rest by purchasing partial insurance against both shocks,
H < I∗. This is because, if the manager combines a partial cash reserve with partial
insurance such that the low shock is just covered, the amount of cash she can con-
sume when the high shock is realized is higher than if cash reserves only are used.
Hence, in this case, cash holding in the amount equal to the size of the low liquidity
shock dominates as it leads to lower ineﬃcient consumption and higher debt capac-
ity than the combination of partial cash holding and partial insurance. Similarly,
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if the manager combines partial cash reserves with partial insurance, H < I∗, such
that the high shock is just covered, the project is excessively continued as in the
full insurance case, but, in addition, the manager can ineﬃciently consume cash
when the low shock is realized. In this case, the combination of partial insurance
and a partial cash holding is dominated by full insurance, H = I∗.
5.2 Low-shock Insurance
Since the insurance against the high liquidity shock leads to ineﬃciency, the next
step is to analyze the case when only insurance against the low liquidity shock is
available. Such insurance contract speciﬁes that if the manager pays premium γH
at date 0, the insurance payoﬀ at date 1
2
is ρH if the low liquidity shock is realized
and zero if the high liquidity shock is realized. All assumptions about insurance
remain unchanged including its availability at a fair price: γH ≡ αρH (H is again
the number of cash units of insurance purchased and γ stands for the unit price of
the low-shock insurance).
The optimal ﬁnancing contract between the manager and the investor under
the low-shock insurance is characterized in Proposition 3.16
Proposition 3. The optimal contract C∗i = {T ∗R,i, T ∗0,i, I∗i , L∗i } has the following
properties:
a) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s failure
is T ∗0,i = 0;
b) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s success
is T ∗R,i ≡ R− BpH−pL < R;
c) total loan provided by the investor satisﬁes L∗i = (1+γ)I∗i −A = αpHT ∗R,iI∗i > 0;
d) investment is I∗i = A
1
1+γ−αpHT ∗R,i > 0;
16Proof of Proposition 3 is analogous to the one for Proposition 2 and is omitted. Subscript i
indicates the case with the low-shock insurance.
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e) manager’s expected payoﬀ is P ∗i = A
(
1 + αpHR−(1+γ)
1+γ−αpHT ∗R,i
)
> A;
f) investor’s expected proﬁt is Π∗i = 0;
g) operational risk is fully insured H∗i = I∗i ;
For the contract to exist, the following conditions on ρ have to be satisﬁed: 0 <
ρ
min,i
< ρ < ρ
max,i
, where ρ
min,i
≡ αpHT
∗
R,i−1
α
and ρ
max,i
≡ αpHR−1
α
.17
As the investor knows that the low liquidity shock is covered by insurance, the
manager cannot credibly claim any additional funds at date 1
2
and the project is
eﬃciently terminated if the high liquidity shock is realized. At the same time, since
the manager carries no cash from date 0 to 1
2
, the ineﬃcient consumption of cash
when the high liquidity shock is realized is prevented too. As a result, the low-shock
insurance eﬃciently solves the moral hazard resulting from the unobservability
of the liquidity shock and the only remaining friction between the parties is the
nonveriﬁability of eﬀort in the second period (fundamental moral hazard). The low-
shock insurance case is equivalent to the investor observing the size of the liquidity
shock directly.
The following lemma conﬁrms that the low-shock insurance is strictly better
than both no insurance and full insurance:
Lemma 4. The optimal ﬁnancing contract under the low-shock insurance induces
higher investment, higher debt capacity, and higher payoﬀ to the manager relative to
both the no insurance and the full insurance case: I∗i > I∗ and I∗i > I∗i ; L∗i > L∗ and
L∗i > L
∗
i ; P ∗i > P ∗ and P ∗i > P ∗i .18
According to Lemma 4, the low-shock insurance, if available at a fair price, is the
best and the most eﬃcient tool to manage the operational risk. More importantly,
if the manager can choose between all possibilities analyzed so far, she selects low-
shock insurance to maximize her payoﬀ. This is eﬃcient since the level of investment
17The equilibrium exists for reasonable parameter values since ρ
min,i
> 0⇔ αpHR−1αpH > BpH−pL ,
which is consistent with the no-insurance case, and ρ
min,i
< ρ
max,i
for any B > 0.
18Proof of Lemma 4 is provided in the Appendix.
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is the highest and the value of the project is the highest. In other words, to prevent
the ineﬃcient continuation of a ﬁrm with a negative value, the manager optimally
chooses to set ex ante a limit above which liquidity shocks are not covered by
insurance. Reasons for less than full hedging or insurance coverage analyzed so far
in the literature come from transaction costs, asymmetric information, or incentives
problems between hedging/insurance markets and a ﬁrm. I provide a new rationale
why ﬁrms should not oﬄoad all risks even if it is possible to do so at fair costs.
From the outside investor’s point of view, the low-shock insurance is beneﬁcial since
it serves as a commitment device for the manager not to consume cash and not to
lie about the size of the liquidity shock at date 1
2
.
6 Contracting with Financial Assets
6.1 Financial Assets
As an alternative to insurance, I allow the insider to manage the operational risk
by investing in a ﬁnancial asset. The ﬁnancial asset is modeled to serve as an
imperfect hedge only, and the analysis in this section can also be viewed as the
one in which the key assumption behind the superiority of the low-shock insurance
is relaxed. As argued earlier, writing insurance contracts requires expertise and
is feasible only if the underlying shock can be described in the contract and the
impact of the event on the value of the ﬁrm can be ex post veriﬁed by the insurer.
In contrast to insurance, the asset’s payoﬀs are not perfectly negatively correlated
with the operational risk (the size of the liquidity shock) and is used as a risk
management tool when it is impossible to write a formal insurance contract. The
aim is to determine what asset types are used and to provide a cost/beneﬁt analysis
across all risk management tools—cash reserves, insurance contracts, and ﬁnancial
assets—in a single tractable framework.
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At date 0 the manager invests cash into the ﬁnancial asset to receive the fol-
lowing payoﬀ structure at date 1
2
: If the low liquidity shock is realized, the asset
gives payoﬀ 0 with probability m and payoﬀ 1 with probability 1−m. In contrast,
if the high liquidity shock is realized, the asset gives payoﬀ 1 with probability m
and 0 with probability 1−m. Consistently with the previous analysis, the asset is
priced fairly and is available in a zero net supply, δH ≡ α(1−m)H + (1− α)mH .
The amount of cash units of the asset (or the face value of the asset) purchased is
denoted as H . Typically, price is 0 < δ < 1 as α ∈ (0, 1) and m ∈ (0, 1). Finally, I
assume that asset’s payoﬀs at date 1
2
are unobservable for the investor. The asset’s
payoﬀ structure is depicted in the following ﬁgure.
Figure 2: Financial asset’s payoﬀ structure
6.2 First-best with Financial Assets
Within the ﬁrst-best framework I compare the use of the ﬁnancial asset with the
benchmark case when the cash reserves only are used. When using the ﬁnancial
asset, the manager buys just enough of it to be able to sustain the low liquidity
shock when the asset’s payoﬀ is positive, H = ρIA.19
Lemma 5. When the ﬁnancial asset only is used as a risk management tool, the
manager buys H = ρIFB,A units of the asset. The expected ﬁrst-best value of the
project is VFB,A = A +
[
α(1−m)(pHR− ρ)− 1
]
IFB,A and the expected ﬁrst-best
19Subscript A indicates the case with the ﬁnancial asset.
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per-unit-of-investment return is lower relative to the ﬁrst-best case with cash for
any m ∈ (0, 1).20
The ﬁnancial asset allows the manager to sustain the low liquidity shock only
with probability 1−m when the asset gives a positive payoﬀ. With probability m
the asset’s payoﬀ is zero, the low liquidity shock cannot be covered, and the project
is ineﬃciently terminated. Holding cash reserves, therefore, dominates investing in
the asset in the ﬁrst-best world whenever m ∈ (0, 1) and the ﬁnancial asset is
equivalent to the case with cash if m = 0.
6.3 Optimal Financing Contract with Financial Assets
Similarly to the full insurance case, there is no beneﬁt from using the ﬁnancial asset
in the ﬁrst-best world. This section shows that the ﬁnancial asset has a positive
eﬀect when the manager is separated from the investor and the project is subject
to moral hazard. The following assumption ensures that the ﬁnancial asset could
be beneﬁcial.
A5 There exists m̂ > 0 deﬁned by α(1 − m̂)(pHR − ρ) ≡ 1 such that for m ∈
(0, m̂) the expected ﬁrst-best per-unit-of-investment return of the project
with investment in the ﬁnancial asset is positive.
According to A5 for m ∈ (0, m̂) the expected ﬁrst-best value of the project
under risk management using the ﬁnancial asset, VFB,A, is positive and increasing in
investment. As in the previous cases, the manager oﬀers the contract to the investor
at date 0, the market for external ﬁnancing is competitive, and the investor accepts
the contract if he breaks even. The optimal ﬁnancing contract is characterized in
Proposition 4.21
20Proof of Lemma 5 is analogous to the one for Lemma 2 and is omitted.
21Proof of Proposition 4 is similar to the one for Proposition 2 and is omitted.
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Proposition 4. The optimal contract C∗A = {T ∗R,A, T ∗0,A, I∗A, L∗A} has the following
properties:
a) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s failure
is T ∗0,A = 0;
b) date 1 transfer from the manager to the investor following the project’s success
is
T ∗R,A = min{T
1
2
R,A, T
1
R,A} where
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T
1
2
R,A ≡ R− ρpH < R and
T 1R,A ≡ R− BpH−pL < R;
c) total loan provided by the investor satisﬁes L∗A = (1 + δρ)I∗A − A = α(1 −
m)pHT
∗
R,AI
∗
A > 0;
d) investment is I∗A = A
1
1+δρ−α(1−m)pHT ∗R,A > 0;
e) manager’s expected payoﬀ is P ∗A = A
(
1 +
α(1−m)(pHR−ρ)−1
1+δρ−α(1−m)pHT ∗R,A
)
> A;
f) investor’s expected proﬁt is Π∗A = 0;
g) the face value of the ﬁnancial asset purchased is H∗ = ρI∗A;
For the contract to exist, the following conditions on m have to be satisﬁed: 0 <
mmin < m < mmax, where mmin ≡ α(pHT
∗
R,A−ρ)−1
α(pHT
∗
R,A−ρ)+(1−α)ρ
and mmax ≡ 1− 1α(pHR−ρ) = m̂.
At date 0, when the contract is signed, part of total loan L∗A is invested in the
project, I∗A − A, and the rest is used to purchase the asset, δρI∗A. In contrast to
the full insurance case, the liquidity shock is not eliminated by investing in the
ﬁnancial asset and hence both incentive constraints are a part of the contract as in
the cash reserves case.
The costs and beneﬁts from using the ﬁnancial asset can be best described by
comparing this case to the insurance and the cash reserves case. If m = 0 the
ﬁnancial asset case is analogous to the low-shock insurance (I∗A = I∗i , L∗A = L∗i ,
and P ∗A = P ∗i ) and hence provides the best possible protection against the liquidity
shock. In contrast, if m = 1, the ﬁnancial asset case is the worst as it gives a
positive payoﬀ only when the high shock is realized. If 0 < m < 1, the ﬁnancial
asset has an advantage relative to full insurance as it does not induce the ineﬃcient
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continuation of the project when the high shock is realized. On the other hand, it
has a disadvantage relative to full insurance as it allows the manager to sustain the
low liquidity shock only with probability 1 − m. With probability m the asset’s
payoﬀ is zero, the low liquidity shock is not covered, and the project is ineﬃciently
terminated. Parameter m measures some basis risk that cannot be hedged using
the asset. The lower the m, the better the hedge of the liquidity shock that can
be achieved using the ﬁnancial asset. Clearly, there have to be threshold values of
m such that for lower values the ﬁnancial asset dominates full insurance and the
opposite is true for higher values of m. If T ∗R,A = T 1R,A = T ∗R,i; the investment is
higher when the ﬁnancial asset is used relative to the full insurance case, I∗A > I∗i , if
and only if m < m1I,i; the debt capacity is higher, L∗A > L∗i , if and only if m < m1L,i;
and the expected manager’s payoﬀ is higher, P ∗A > P ∗i , if and only if m < m1P,i.
Similarly, if T ∗R,A = T
1
2
R,A < T
∗
R,i; the investment is higher when the ﬁnancial asset
is used relative to the full insurance case, I∗A > I∗i , if and only if m < m
1
2
I,i; the
debt capacity is higher, L∗A > L∗i , if and only if m < m
1
2
L,i; and the expected
manager’s payoﬀ is higher, P ∗A > P ∗i , if and only if m < m
1
2
P,i.
22 In comparison
to the cash reserves case, the ﬁnancial asset has again a disadvantage as it allows
the manager to sustain the low liquidity shock only with probability 1 −m. The
beneﬁt of the ﬁnancial asset relative to the cash reserves case is that the expected
ineﬃcient consumption of cash when the high liquidity shock arrives is lower; cash
is ineﬃciently consumed only with probability m when the asset gives a positive
payoﬀ. In other words, to transfer one unit of cash from date 0 to date 1
2
is cheaper
using the ﬁnancial asset relative to holding a cash reserve. In order to have one
unit of cash at date 1
2
, the manager has to put aside one unit of cash at date 0 and
the amount invested into the project decreases by the same amount. In contrast,
when purchasing the ﬁnancial asset the manger pays price δ < 1 to receive one unit
22Analytical expressions for thresholds m1I,i, m
1
L,i, m
1
P,i, m
1
2
I,i, m
1
2
L,i, and m
1
2
P,i are provided in
section 8.5 of the Appendix.
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of cash at date 1
2
. Overall, the ineﬃcient termination of the project when the low
shock is realized trades oﬀ against the ﬁnancial asset’s lower cost. The investment
in the project when the ﬁnancial asset is used is higher relative to the cash reserves
case, I∗A > I∗, if and only if m < mI , and the debt capacity is higher, L∗A > L∗, if
and only if m < mL. Similar inequalities hold for the manager’s expected payoﬀ: If
T ∗R,A = T
1
2
R,A = T
1
2
R , then P
∗
A > P
∗ if and only if m < m
1
2
P ; and if T
∗
R,A = T
1
R,A = T
1
R,
then P ∗A > P ∗ if and only if m < m1P .23
The comparison indicates that risk management using a full insurance contract
or cash reserves can be dominated by the use of the ﬁnancial asset if the asset’s
payoﬀ is positive when the low shock arrives with a high enough probability and if
the asset’s payoﬀ is zero when the high shock arrives with a high enough probability.
The opposite is true if the asset’s payoﬀ is positive when the high shock arrives
with a high enough probability and if the asset’s payoﬀ is zero when the low shock
arrives with a high enough probability. In other words, the payoﬀ from the asset
has to be suﬃciently negatively correlated with the size of the liquidity shock.
7 Conclusion
I analyze three possible ways how ﬁrms manage their operational risks—building
up cash reserves, using insurance contracts, and investing in ﬁnancial assets. I
investigate the eﬀect from employing these tools on the ability of the ﬁrm to raise
funding from outside investors in an optimal contracting framework. Risk man-
agement activities are pursued in my setup as they alleviate moral hazard between
insiders and outside investors, and hence decrease the cost of external ﬁnancing,
increase the debt capacity of the ﬁrm, and allow the ﬁrm to invest more.
The best way to manage operational risk is to use insurance contracts provided
23Analytical expressions for thresholds mI , mL, m
1
2
P , and m
1
P are provided in section 8.5 of the
Appendix.
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that the insurer observes shocks aﬀecting the ﬁrm, adjusts insurance payoﬀ accord-
ingly, and behaves competitively. I provide a new rationale for having limits on
insurance coverage because the insurance of risks of all sizes is ex ante ineﬃcient as
it ex post leads to the excessive continuation of the ﬁrm. I show that the insurance
coverage limits are set such that the ﬁrm with a negative continuation value caused
by a pending large shock to the ﬁrm’s operations is liquidated relying on limited
liability. If insurance against an operational risk is not available or if insurance
contracts with coverage limits do not exist, the ﬁrm uses ﬁnancial assets or resorts
to holding cash reserves. I provide a detailed analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of
these risk management tools, and I state conditions under which one is preferred
to the others. Insurance with no coverage limits dominates holding cash when the
lowest value of a shock with which the ﬁrm can be hit is high or when the highest
value of a shock with which the ﬁrm can be hit is low. Finally, I show that accu-
mulating cash reserves and the use of insurance contracts is always dominated by
investing in ﬁnancial assets if the correlation between assets’ payoﬀs and the shocks
is suﬃciently aligned.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
8.1.1 Contract Structure
The contract is contingent on date 1 veriﬁable payoﬀs. Assumption A2 implies that
the contract has to implement high eﬀort in the second period. The realization of
the liquidity shock at date 1
2
is not observable for the investor and the contract can
be contingent only on messages sent by the manager, {ρ̂, ρ̂}, where ρ̂ is understood
as the low liquidity shock message and ρ̂ as the high liquidity shock message. The
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contract is an 8-tuple
C = {T (ρ̂, R), T (ρ̂, 0), T (ρ̂, R), T (ρ̂, 0), t(ρ̂), t(ρ̂), I, L}, (7)
where T (ρ̂, R) is date 1 per-unit-of-investment cash transfer from the manager to
the investor following message ρ̂ and outcome R (transfers T (ρ̂, 0), T (ρ̂, R), T (ρ̂, 0)
are deﬁned analogously); t(ρ̂) is date 1
2
per-unit-of-investment cash transfer from the
investor to the manager following message ρ̂ (transfer t(ρ̂) is deﬁned analogously);
I > 0 is total cash invested by the manager into the project at date 0; and L is
total cash transfer (amount lent) from the investor to the manager, L ≥ I −A.
8.1.2 Truth-telling
Let’s ﬁrst analyze the situation at date 1
2
following the arrival of high liquidity
shock ρ. Only the manager knows the true value of the liquidity shock. Assumption
A1 implies that no matter what amount of cash the manager brought to date 1
2
from date 0, she is better oﬀ by consuming this cash (as well as consuming any
additional cash she receives, if any, from the investor at this date) and not continue
the project.24 If she sends message ρ̂, the investor does not provide any additional
cash, t(ρ̂) ≤ 0, and since the manager has no incentive to return the cash, t(ρ̂) ≥ 0,
there is no cash transfer following the high liquidity shock message, t(ρ̂) = 0. If the
manager sends message ρ̂ and the transfer from the investor is positive, t(ρ̂) > 0,
the manager consumes transfer t(ρ̂). To prevent the manager from lying about the
size of the shock, the transfer that follows the low liquidity shock message has to
be nonpositive, t(ρ̂) ≤ 0, and since the manager has no incentive to return the cash
to the investor, there is no cash transfer, t(ρ̂) = 0, following the low liquidity shock
message as well. Therefore, date 1
2
transfers are equal zero, t(ρ̂) = t(ρ̂) = 0, and
24Following the high liquidity shock, the project has a negative continuation value and neither
the manager nor the investor can commit ex ante to pursue the project that loses money.
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are consistent with not lying when the high liquidity shock arrives.
If low liquidity shock ρ arrives at date 1
2
, the project is worth continuing if
high eﬀort is exerted in the second period. (Assume that the contract is such
that high eﬀort is implemented and the manager has just enough cash to cover
the low liquidity shock. These assumptions are veriﬁed in the next subsection.) If
the manager sends message ρ̂, the investor does not provide any additional cash,
t(ρ̂) = 0, and the manager continues the project iﬀ the following condition is
satisﬁed:
pH
[
R− T (ρ̂, R)
]
− (1− pH)T (ρ̂, 0) ≥ ρ. (8)
On the left-hand-side there is the payoﬀ from continuing the project, and on the
right-hand-side there is the payoﬀ from consuming cash immediately. If the man-
ager sends message ρ̂, the investor does not provide any additional cash, t(ρ̂) = 0,
as he knows that the manager has enough cash to cover the low shock and the
manager continues the project iﬀ the analogous condition to (8) is satisﬁed:
pH
[
R− T (ρ̂, R)]− (1− pH)T (ρ̂, 0) ≥ ρ. (9)
Assuming that the contract is such that the project is continued when the low
liquidity shock arrives (again, this is veriﬁed in the next subsection), the manager
does not lie about the size of the liquidity shock iﬀ
pH
[
R− T (ρ̂, R)]− (1− pH)T (ρ̂, 0) ≥ pH [R− T (ρ̂, R)]− (1− pH)T (ρ̂, 0),
which can be rewritten as
pH
[
T (ρ̂, R)− T (ρ̂, R)
]
− (1− pH)
[
T (ρ̂, 0)− T (ρ̂, 0)
]
≥ 0. (10)
Conditions (8), (9), and (10) imply that without loss of generality one can set
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TR ≡ T (ρ̂, R) = T (ρ̂, R) and T0 ≡ T (ρ̂, 0) = T (ρ̂, 0), and rewrite contract (7) in
the simplest form:
C ′ = {TR, T0, I, L}. (11)
8.1.3 Manager’s Problem
According to assumptions A1 and A2, the contract has to induce high eﬀort and
make the manager abandon the project when the high liquidity shock is realized.
The expected payoﬀ for the manager is
P = A + L− I + α [pH(R− TR)− (1− pH)T0 − ρ] I, (12)
and the expected proﬁt for the investor is
Π = −L + α [pHTR + (1− pH)T0] I. (13)
The optimal contract can be found as a solution to the following problem:
max
C′
{P} subject to:
P ≥ A (PCmanager)
Π ≥ 0 (PCinvestor)
pH(R − TR)− (1− pH)T0 ≥ pL(R− TR)− (1− pL)T0 + B (ICdate1)
pH(R− TR)− (1− pH)T0 ≥ ρ (ICdate 12 )
A + L− I ≥ 0 (14)
A + L− I ≥ ρI (15)
A + L− I ≥ ρI − (RI − TRI) (16)
A + L− I ≥ ρI + T0I (17)
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The manager maximizes her payoﬀ so that both parties want to participate in
the project, constraints (PCmanager) and (PCinvestor); high eﬀort is exerted in the
second period, constraint (ICdate1); and the manager prefers to continue the project
following realization of the low liquidity shock, constraint (ICdate
1
2 ). Assume that
the manager’s payoﬀ P is increasing in the amount of cash invested into the project,
and it is optimal for her to invest as much cash as possible at date 0. (This
assumption is veriﬁed at the end of this paragraph.) If the manager invested all
cash and the project fails at date 1 (its payoﬀ is zero), the manager has no cash to
repay the investor, and the optimal contract has to set T ∗0 = 0. For the same reason,
if the manager invested all cash and the project succeeds at date 1 (its payoﬀ is R),
transfer following success T ∗R is not greater than R. Using T ∗0 = 0, one can rewrite
incentive constraint (ICdate1) as T ∗R ≤ T 1R ≡ R − BpH−pL and incentive constraint
(ICdate
1
2 ) as T ∗R ≤ T
1
2
R ≡ R− ρpH . The manager’s payoﬀ P is decreasing in TR whereas
the investor’s payoﬀ Π is increasing in TR. Hence, depending on parameter values,
at least one of the two incentive constraints, (ICdate1) or (ICdate
1
2 ), is binding.
Since both incentive constraints have to be satisﬁed at the same time, the optimal
contract sets T ∗R = min{T
1
2
R , T
1
R}. Also, the manager’s payoﬀ P is increasing in
L whereas the investor’s payoﬀ Π is decreasing in L. Since the market for loans
is competitive the investor’s participation constraint is binding as well. Binding
participation constraint (PCinvestor) implies that the optimal loan is equal to the
expected pledgeable payoﬀ for the investor:
L∗ = αpHT ∗RI
∗. (18)
Substituting (18) into the manager’s expected payoﬀ (12) and simplifying gives
P ∗ = A +
[
α(pHR− ρ)− 1
]
I∗. (19)
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According to assumption A3, α(pHR−ρ) > 1, and the manager’s payoﬀ is increas-
ing in investment I∗.
Inequalities (14) to (17) are feasibility constraints imposed by the structure of
the model. Condition (14) states that the loan provided by the investor has to cover
the need for external ﬁnancing given the investment decision at date 0. Condition
(15) says that given loan L, investment I, and the manager’s cash A, the insider is
able to withstand the low liquidity shock at date 1
2
. Inequality (16) is the limited
liability condition that imposes an upper bound on possible repayment TR to the
investor if the project succeeds at date 1. Similarly, (17) is the limited liability
condition that imposes an upper bound on possible repayment T0 to the investor
if the project fails at date 1. Note that because T ∗0 = 0 constraint (17) is identical
to (15) and can be removed from the problem. Similarly, constraint (14) can be
removed since if (15) is satisﬁed, (14) is satisﬁed as well. Rearranging constraint
(16) one gets L ≥ I − A + ρI − (R − TR)I, and since T ∗R ≤ R, constraint (16) is
satisﬁed when (15) is satisﬁed and (15) is the only relevant constraint. Since the
manager’s payoﬀ is increasing in investment, she keeps the least amount of cash
possible from date 0 to date 1
2
and constraint (15) is binding:
L∗ = I∗ − A + ρI∗. (20)
The optimal investment level can be solved from equations (18) and (20):
I∗ = A
1
1 + ρ− αpHT ∗R
. (21)
8.1.4 Existence
Assumption A3 imposes an upper bound on the size of the small liquidity shock
ρ < ρ
max
≡ αpHR−1
α
. To have positive investment in equilibrium, according to (21)
1 + ρ − αpHT ∗R > 0. If T ∗R = T
1
2
R , investment is positive iﬀ ρ > ρ
1
2
min ≡ αpHR−11+α and
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the suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium to exist is
0 < ρ
1
2
min ≡
αpHR− 1
1 + α
< ρ < ρ
max
≡ αpHR− 1
α
. (22)
Assumption A3 implies that αpHR − 1 > 0 and according to conditions in (22)
the equilibrium always exists since 0 < ρ
1
2
min < ρmax is always satisﬁed. If T
∗
R = T
1
R,
investment is positive iﬀ ρ > ρ1
min
≡ αpH
(
R− B
pH−pL
)
− 1 and the suﬃcient
condition for the equilibrium to exist is
0 < ρ1
min
≡ αpH
(
R− B
pH − pL
)
− 1 < ρ < ρ
max
≡ αpHR− 1
α
. (23)
According to conditions (23), equilibrium exists iﬀ 0 < ρ1
min
< ρ
max
,which can be
rewritten as
αpHR− 1
αpH
>
B
pH − pL >
αpHR − 1
αpH
− αpHR− 1
α2
.
Since assumption A3 holds, αpHR − 1 > 0, and the equilibrium exists for some
values of B.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Deﬁne H as the level of insurance that solves equation pHRIFB,i − ρ(IFB,i −
H) = 0. If 0 < H < H , it is ex post optimal to liquidate the project if the
high liquidity shock arrives and the value of the project is VFB,i = A − IFB,i −
λH +α
[
pHRIFB,i − ρ(IFB,i −H)
]
, which under a fair insurance price simpliﬁes to
VFB,i = A− (1− α)ρH +
[
α(pHR− ρ)− 1
]
IFB,i. Since (1− α)ρH > 0, the value
of the project is lower relative to the ﬁrst-best case without insurance.
If H > H > 0, it is ex post optimal to continue the project if the high liq-
uidity shock arrives and the value of the project is VFB,i = A − IFB,i − λH +
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α
[
pHRIFB,i − ρ(IFB,i −H)
]
+(1−α) [pHR− ρ(IFB,i −H)], which under a fair in-
surance price simpliﬁes to VFB,i = A+(1−α)(pHR−ρ)IFB,i+
[
α(pHR − ρ)− 1
]
IFB,i.
Assumption A1 implies that (1−α)(pHR−ρ)IFB,i < 0 and the value of the project
is lower relative to the ﬁrst-best case without insurance.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
8.3.1 Manager’s Problem
The proof is analogical to the case without insurance but there is no liquidity shock
at date 1
2
. According to assumptions A1, A2, and A4, the contract has to induce
high eﬀort. The payoﬀ for the manager is
Pi = A + Li − (1 + λ)Ii + [pH(R− TR,i)− (1− pH)T0,i] Ii, (24)
and the proﬁt for the investor is
Πi = −Li + [pHTR,i + (1− pH)T0,i] Ii. (25)
The optimal contract can be found as a solution to the following problem:
max
C′
{Pi} subject to: (26)
Pi ≥ A (PCmanageri )
Πi ≥ 0 (PCinvestori )
pH(R− TR,i)− (1− pH)T0.i ≥ pL(R− TR,i)− (1− pL)T0,i + B (ICdate1i )
A + Li − Ii − λIi ≥ 0 (27)
A + Li − Ii − λIi ≥ TR,iIi − RIi (28)
A + Li − Ii − λIi ≥ T0,iIi (29)
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The manager maximizes her payoﬀ so that both parties want to participate in
the project, constraints (PCmanageri ) and (PCinvestori ); and high eﬀort is exerted in
the second period, constraint (ICdate1i ). Assume that the manager’s payoﬀ Pi is
increasing in the amount of cash invested into the project, and it is optimal for
her to invest as much cash as possible at date 0. (This assumption is veriﬁed at
the end of this paragraph.) If the manager invested all cash and the project fails
at date 1 (its payoﬀ is zero), the manager has no cash to repay the investor, and
the optimal contract has to set T ∗0,i = 0. For the same reason, if the manager
invested all cash and the project succeeds at date 1 (its payoﬀ is R), transfer T ∗R,i is
not greater than R. Using T ∗0,i = 0, one can rewrite incentive constraint (ICdate1i )
as T ∗R,i ≤ R − BpH−pL . The manager’s payoﬀ Pi is decreasing in TR,i whereas the
investor’s payoﬀ Πi is increasing in TR,i. Hence, incentive constraint (ICdate1i ) is
binding and T ∗R,i = R − BpH−pL . Also, the manager’s payoﬀ Pi is increasing in Li
whereas the investor’s payoﬀ Πi is decreasing in Li. Since the market for loans
is competitive the investor’s participation constraint is binding as well. Binding
participation constraint (PCinvestori ) implies that the optimal loan is equal to the
expected pledgeable payoﬀ for the investor:
L∗i = pHT
∗
R,iI
∗
i . (30)
Substituting (30) into the manager’s expected payoﬀ (24) and simplifying gives
P ∗i = A + (pHR− 1− λ)I∗i . (31)
According to assumption A4, pHR − 1 − λ > 0, and the manager’s payoﬀ is
increasing in investment I∗i .
Inequalities (27) to (29) are feasibility constraints imposed by the structure of
the model. Condition (27) states that the loan provided by the investor has to cover
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the need for external ﬁnancing given investment decision at date 0 and insurance
premium λIi. Inequality (28) is the limited liability condition that imposes an upper
bound on possible repayment TR,i to the investor if the project succeeds at date
1. Similarly, (29) is the limited liability condition that imposes an upper bound
on possible repayment T0 to the investor if the project fails at date 1. Because
T ∗0 = 0, constraint (29) is identical to (27) and can be removed from the problem.
Rearranging constraint (28) one gets Li ≥ (1 + λ)Ii − A − (R − TR,i)Ii and since
T ∗R,i ≤ R constraint (28) is satisﬁed when (27) is satisﬁed and (27) is the only
relevant constraint to the problem. Since the manager’s payoﬀ is increasing in
investment, she invests all cash at date 0 and constraint (27) is binding:
L∗i = (1 + λ)I
∗
i − A. (32)
The optimal investment level can be solved from equations (30) and (32):
I∗i = A
1
1 + λ− pHT ∗R,i
. (33)
8.3.2 Existence
Assumption A4 imposes an upper bound on the price of insurance λ < λmax ≡
pHR − 1. To have a positive investment in equilibrium, according to (33), 1 +
λ − pHT ∗R,i > 0. This gives the lower bound on the price of insurance λ > λmin ≡
pH
(
R − B
pH−pL
)
−1. Equilibrium exists iﬀ 0 < λmin < λmax, which can be rewritten
as 0 < B
pH−pL <
pHR−1
pH
. Since assumption A4 holds, pHR − 1 > 0, and the
equilibrium exists for some positive values of B.
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8.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The investment under the low-shock insurance is bigger than under the no insur-
ance: I∗i > I∗ iﬀ 1+ρ−αpHT ∗R > 1+αρ−αpHT ∗R,i. If T ∗R = T 1R = T ∗R,i, the inequality
simpliﬁes to ρ > αρ, which always holds; if T ∗R = T
1
2
R < T
∗
R,i, the inequality is a
fortiori satisﬁed. The debt capacity under the low-shock insurance is bigger than
under the no insurance: L∗i > L∗ iﬀ αpHT ∗R,iI∗i > αpHT ∗RI∗. If T ∗R = T 1R = T ∗R,i, the
inequality simpliﬁes to I∗i > I∗, which holds as was shown above; if T ∗R = T
1
2
R < T
∗
R,i,
the inequality is a fortiori satisﬁed. The manager’s payoﬀ under the low-shock insur-
ance is bigger than under the no insurance: P ∗i > P ∗ iﬀ
αpHR−(1+γ)
1+γ−αpHT ∗R,i >
α(pHR−ρ)−1
1+ρ−αpHT ∗R .
This inequality simpliﬁes to 1 + ρ− αpHT ∗R > 1 + αρ− αpHT ∗R,i, which is satisﬁed
as was shown when comparing the investment levels.
The investment under the low-shock insurance is bigger than under the full
insurance: I∗i > I∗i iﬀ 1 + λ − pHT ∗R,i > 1 + γ − αpHT ∗R,i. Since T ∗R,i = T ∗R,i,
the inequality simpliﬁes to pH BpH−pL > pHR − ρ. This inequality is satisﬁed as
the left-hand-side is positive for B > 0 whereas the right-hand-side is negative
by assumption A1. The debt capacity under the low-shock insurance is bigger
than under full insurance: L∗i > L∗i iﬀ αpHT ∗R,iI∗i > pHT ∗R,iI∗i , which simpliﬁes to
α(1+λ) > 1+γ. Substituting for fair insurance prices λ and γ one gets ρ−ρ > 1
α
.
The last inequality is satisﬁed because assumptions A1 and A4 hold. A1 implies
that ρ > ρlowest ≡ pHR. Substituting ρlowest into A4 leads to ρ− ρ > 1α + ρ−ρlowestα .
Since ρ > ρlowest, inequality ρ− ρ > 1α has to be satisﬁed if A1 and A4 hold. The
manager’s payoﬀ under the low-shock insurance is bigger than under full insurance:
P ∗i > P
∗
i iﬀ
αpHR−(1+γ)
1+γ−αpHT ∗R,i
> pHR−(1+λ)
1+λ−pHT ∗R,i
, which simpliﬁes to α(1 + λ) > 1 + γ. As
shown above, this inequality is satisﬁed.
37
8.5 Financial Asset Thresholds
Threshold values of m such that for lower values the ﬁnancial asset dominates full
insurance and the opposite is true for higher values of m are as follows.
If T ∗R,A = T 1R,A = T ∗R,i then
m1I,i ≡
(1−α)(ρ−pHT 1R,A)
α(pHT
1
R,A−ρ)+(1−α)ρ
,
m1L,i ≡
(1−α)[α(ρ−ρ)−1]
(1−α)[α(ρ−ρ)+ρ]+α , and
m1P,i ≡
pHB(1−α)[α(ρ−ρ)−1]
(pH−pL)(1−α)ρ[pHR−ρ−1+α(ρ−ρ)]+αpHB[1−(1−α)]ρ+ρ(1−α)
;
if T ∗R,A = T
1
2
R,A < T
∗
R,i then
m
1
2
I,i ≡
(1−α)ρ−pH(T ∗R,i−αT
1
2
R,A)
αpHT
1
2
R,A+ρ(1−2α)
,
m
1
2
L,i ≡
αT
1
2
R,A[α(ρ−ρ)−ρ−1]+T ∗R,i(1+αρ)
αT
1
2
R,A[α(ρ−ρ)−ρ−1]+T ∗R,i(2α−1)
, and
m
1
2
P,i ≡
pHB[α(pHR−ρ)−1]−(pH−pL)αρ[pHR−ρ−1+α(ρ−ρ)]
αpHB(pHR−ρ)−(pH−pL)(2α−1)ρ[pHR−ρ−1+α(ρ−ρ)]
.
Threshold values of m such that for lower values the ﬁnancial asset dominates
holding cash reserves and the opposite is true for higher values of m are as follows.
mI ≡ (1−α)ρα(pHT ∗R,A−ρ)+(1−α)ρ ,
mL ≡ (1−α)ρ1+(1−α)2ρ ,
m
1
2
P ≡
(1−α)[α(pHR−ρ)−1]
2α[(1−α)(pHR−ρ)+1]−1
, and
m1P ≡
(1−α)ρ[α(pHR−ρ)−1]
(1−α)ρ[2α(pHR−ρ)−1]+αpH BpH−pL
.
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